Foreign Migratory Divorces: A Reappraisal by Swisher, Peter N.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
1982
Foreign Migratory Divorces: A Reappraisal
Peter N. Swisher
University of Richmond, pswisher@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Nash Swisher, Foreign Migratory Divorces: A Reappraisal, 21 J. Fam. L. 9 (1982).
FOREIGN MIGRATORY DIVORCES: A
REAPPRAISAL
by Peter Nash Swisher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past twenty-five years there have been nu-
merous articles written about the effects of foreign country
migratory divorces on American domiciliaries. Most deal
with Mexican divorces.' Since March 7, 1971, these Mexi-
can divorces have become less available to American citi-
zens, due to amendments to Mexican law which require
aliens to become legal residents of Mexico before obtaining
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School; Member, California
and Virginia Bars, B.A. Amherst College, 1966; M.A. Stanford University, 1967;
J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1973.
' See, e.g., Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Di-
vorce, 70 YALE L. J. 45 (1960); Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws:
Simon, Rosenthiel and Borax, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 26 (1966); Foster, Recognition of
Migratory Divorces: Rosenthiel v. Section 250, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 429 (1968); Gar-
field, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58 Tx.
L. REv. 501 (1980); Leach, Divorce by Plane-Ticket in the Affluent Society-With
a Side Order of Jurisprudence, 14 KA. L. Rav. 549 (1966); Lipstein, Recognition
of Foreign Divorces: Retrospects and Prospects, 2 OTTAWA L. Rim. 49 (1967); Pe-
terson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220 (1972); Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country
Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1963); Phillips, Equitable Preclusion of Juris-
dictional Attacks on Void Divorces, 37 FORDHAU L. Rav. 355 (1969); Rosenberg,
How Void is a Void Decree, or The Estoppel Effect of Invalid Divorce Decrees, 8
FAM. L.Q. 207 (1974); Note, Domestic Relations-Jurisdiction-Extension of
Comity to Foreign Nation Divorce, 46 TENN. L. Rav. 238 (1978); Note, United
States Recognition of Foreign, Nonjudicial Divorces, 53 MINN. L. Rav. 612 (1969);
Comment, Mexican Divorces: Are They Recognized in California?, 4 CAL. W.L.
REV. 341 (1968); Comment, Mexican Divorce-A Survey, 33 FORDHAm L. Rav. 449
(1965).
See also Annot., Domestic Recognition of Divorce Decree Obtained in For-
eign Country and Attacked for Lack of Domicile or Jurisdiction of the Parties, 13
A.L.R.3d 1419 (1967).
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a divorce.2 Nevertheless, Mexican divorces continue to cre-
ate problems in many American jurisdictions.'
In addition to Mexico, the Dominican Republic and
Haiti have joined this "quickie" foreign divorce market,4
advertising in prominent periodicals,6 and offering various
Article 35 of the Mexican Code (D.O. 35) now requires six months residence
before a non-citizen can petition for a Mexican divorce. Amended Article 35 pro-
vides that: "No judicial or administrative agency shall entertain a divorce. . . of a
foreigner if not accompanied by the certificate that is issued by the Secretary of
Gobernacion as to his legal residence in [Mexico] and that his immigration status
permits it to be acquired." Prior to this amendment of the Mexican Code, Mexi-
can migratory divorces for Americans was reportedly a fifty million dollar-a-year
business that catered to approximately 18,000 Americans each year. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1972, § 10, at 1, col. 1.
4 See Miller, Mexican Divorces Revisited, 84 CASE AND COMMENT No. 4, at 43.
A major problem is that "legal residence" for "foreigners" under Mexican law may
not be recognized under American law, since this residency might not qualify as
the parties' marital domicile. See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
I In both the Dominican Republic and Haiti no domiciliary intent nor resi-
dency requirement is necessary to procure a divorce. Dominican Law 142, Article
I, Paragraph V of May 18, 1971, provides: "Foreigners who are in this country,
although not residents, can be divorced by mutual consent, providing, however,
that at least one of the parties must be physically present, and the other repre-
sented by a special attorney in fact." Haitian Law of June 28, 1971, Article X
provides that: "Tourists, visiting persons, and residing aliens may apply to Hai-
tian courts for a domicile in Haiti during the pendency of the divorce action" and
Article II of the same law provides that Haitian courts will be competent to grant
divorces "when a foreign plaintiff personally submits voluntarily to the Haitian
jurisdiction and when a defendant shall have appointed a duly mandated repre-
sentative .... " See generally Note, Isle of Hispaniola: American Divorce Ha-
ven?, 5 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 198, 198-203 (1973); and Note, Caribbean Divorce
for Americans: Useful Alternative or Obsolescent Institution?, 10 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 116, 117-20 (1976). Although mutual consent is the exclusive ground for for-
eign divorces in the Dominican Republic, other Haitian divorce grounds are in-
compatibility, adultery, cruelty, excesses, grave and public insults and imprison-
ment. "Incompatability of temperament" appears to be the most widely used
Haitian divorce ground for Americans. See also Note, The Haitian Vacation: The
Applicability of Sham Doctrine to Year-End Divorces, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1332
(1979) (tax implications of Haitian divorces) and Comment, Recognition of Hai-
tian-Dominican Divorce in New York, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 158 (1972).
5 See, e.g., "Divorce in 24 hours. Dominican Republic or Haiti. Mutual Con-
sent or Contested Actions. Full Travel Services. Overland Dominican Advisory. P.
0. Box 5, Hyattsville, Md. 20781" (advertisement in the Washington Post, Oct. 11,
1976, § B, at 4, col. 3 ); "Divorce in 24 Hours. Mutual or Contested Actions, low
cost, Haiti or Dominican Republic. Dr. F. Gonzales, 1835 K. St. N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20006..." (advertisement in the International Herald Tribune, August
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"divorce-tour packages" for Americans. Solicitations by
Haitian and Dominican divorce lawyers have also been
mailed directly to many American attorneys.7
8, 1979, at 14, col. 3); and the following misrepresentation: "One Day Di-
vorce-Dominican, Mexican, Haitian . . . Legal All States . . . Divorce Consent
or Non-Consent. Air and Ground Travel 1 Nights Hotel. Can Go Fri. Night and
Return Sat. (also marriage same day) . . . "One Day" provides total service. Just
hop on and go. Write "One Day" Box 404 Danbury, Ct. 06810. Call 203-744-0686 8
AM to 10 PM E.S.T. 7 days a week." (advertisement in the Star, Sept. 1, 1981, at
30, col. 2)(Emphasis added).
6 A good description of these "divorce tours" is found in Kugler v. Haitian
Tours, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 260, 293 A.2d 706 (1972) (Haitian divorces are not
recognized in New Jersey, and defendants were found guilty of violating the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act).
7 E.g., undated letter from Maurice S. Bell, Counselor of Haitian Law, mailed
to numerous American attorneys:
Dear Counselor:
My firm would like to take this opportunity to familiarize you with
the divorce law of the Republic of Haiti. This law permits persons who
are non-Haitian Nationals to discreetly obtain a divorce within a
twenty-four hour period, with a minimum of expense.
No domiciliary intent nor residence requirement is necessary. The
Plaintiff must personally appear in the Haitian Court and the Defen-
dant submits to said jurisdiction by executing a special Power of Attor-
ney. These bilateral divorces are final and not interlocutory and both
parties are free to marry immediately thereafter.
I am taking the liberty of enclosing a two-page general information
sheet regarding Haitian divorces, a set of forms for your possible future
use, and a New York Supreme Court decision in the Kraham matter,
whereby the Court upheld the validity of a bilateral Haitian divorce
By way of background, I am currently a licensed attorney in the
State of Alabama, having been admitted to the Bar in 1950. In 1965, 1
moved my law practice to Juarez, Mexico, where I specialized in matri-
monial matters. In late 1970 the Government of Haiti requested my as-
sistance in the drafting of the present divorce law for non-Haitian Na-
tionals. At that time, I was granted permission to engage in the practice
of Matrimonial Law before the Courts of Haiti.
Should the occasion arise that you require additional forms or fur-
ther information, please feel free to contact my office at any time . ..
Enclosed with Mr. Bell's letter there is "general information on Haitian divorces"
including a Power of Attorney form where the Defendant may "nominate, consti-
tute and appoint Mr. MARC L. RAYMOND, an Attorney-at-Law as my attorney
I . . to accept service for me, to appear for me and in my behalf at all hearings,
and to answer such claims as he sees fit."
This advertising to solicit and procure such a divorce may itself be in viola-
tion of various state statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 20-122 (1975); and N.J. REv.
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Since these divorces are not recognized by most Ameri-
can courts, because of jurisdictional and public policy rea-
sons, 8 the continued practice of obtaining these di-
vorces-and the convoluted rationale supporting it-has
become "distorted beyond recognition,"' and it remains
ethically questionable for American attorneys to engage in
it.'0
Overall, the concept of foreign country migratory di-
vorces for American domiciliaries-with its jurisdictional
and public policy defects; its alleged "defense" of estoppel;
and with one exception piled upon another-has become so
confusing to the lay public and the practicing bar that very
few people adequately understand the underlying ramifica-
tions and liabilities involved in such divorces.1
The purpose of this Article is to review and reappraise
STAT. § 56:8-2, cited in Kugler v. Haitian Tours, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 260, 293
A.2d 706 (1972). Federal law also declares it a crime to mail foreign divorce infor-
mation with intent to solicit business, 18 U.S.C. § 1714 (1948) (up to $5000 fine
and one year in prison).
See infra notes 17-27, 62-79 and accompanying text.
(Tihe law of migratory divorce inhabits a looking-glass world in which
the usual conflicts principles are distorted beyond recognition. Jurisdic-
tion over the defendant seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient to
empower a court to hear a divorce case . . . .Jurisdiction is sustained
every day on the basis of testimony that nobody begins to believe ....
The Constitution is lost in the shuffle, and the law is held up to
disrespect.
Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenthiel, and Borax,
34 U. Cm. L. REV. 26 (1966).
'O "A lawyer advising his client concerning the availability and effect of...
migratory divorces faces extremely difficult ethical problems .... The law in this
area is in such a state of hypocrisy and dishonesty that a lawyer who gives realistic
advice about migratory divorce places his professional reputation at some hazard."
H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 295 (1968).
" This continuing confusion with foreign migratory divorces is shown by con-
tradictory results within the same court. Compare Berry v. Berry, No. C76-593
(Cir. Ct. of Va. Beach, Va., Dec. 14, 1976) (bilateral Haitian divorce not recog-
nized, with an extensive supporting report from the Commissioner in Chancery)
with Bloom v. Bloom, No. C77-750 (Cir. Ct. of Va. Beach, Va., Aug. 26, 1977)
(bilateral Haitian divorce recognized without discussion from the Commissioner in
Chancery). In both cases the Defendant's Power of Attorney was through Mr.
Marc Raymond, and among Plaintiff's attorneys was, presumably, Maurice S. Bell,
Counselor of Haitian Law. See supra note 7.
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the important legal principles involved in foreign country
migratory divorces; to discuss the various public policy ra-
tionales behind them; and to suggest possible remedies to
alleviate much of this ambiguity and confusion.
In undertaking this evaluation, the author is mindful of
dual responsibilities-that divorce law in this area should
be predictable and uniform in order to maintain the author-
ity of legal piecedent; but at the same time it must attempt
to approximate, as closely as possible, the clearly demon-
strated needs of society.
II. JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOGNITION OF A
FOREIGN DIVORCE
A. The Principle of Comity
(1) Comity and its Public Policy Defense
It is a well-established principle of American law that a
divorce or marital dissolution granted within the United
States by a court having proper jurisdiction must be recog-
nized in all sister states under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution."3
12 One of the most fundamental social interests is that law shall be uni-
form and impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of
prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Therefore, in the
main there shall be adherence to precedent .... But symmetrical de-
velopment may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases to be a
good when it becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interest
served by symmetry ... must then be balanced against the social inter-
est served by equity and fairness or other elements of social welfare.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 112-13 (1949).
is U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides in part: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State." See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina [II], 325 U.S. 226 (1945) and
Williams v. North Carolina [I], 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (ex parte divorces); Cook v.
Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951) and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (bilateral
divorce).
Like the commerce clause, the full faith and credit clause represents an
instrument of uniformity in the nation. At the same time it respects the
diversity among the states which is inherent in the federal system. The
result in matrimonial affairs should be a free flow of people from state to
state without fear of actions for bigamy, support, etc. by either the for-
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Divorces granted in foreign countries, however, are not
recognized in American jurisdictions under the mandatory
concept of full faith and credit, but rather through the dis-
cretionary principle of comity. " As enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in the case of Hilton v. Guyot,"5 comity is de-
fined as:
[N]either a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to legis-
lative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.1 6
Yet a state may not give comity to a foreign divorce "when
contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests," 7 and
thus decisions extending comity to a foreign divorce usually
involve public policy considerations of possible prejudice to
the state, its citizens, and the parties themselves. 8 While
mer spouse, the government, or another party. This flow of people is
needed to maintain the strength of the economy and assure the full en-
joyment of personal rights. The full faith and credit clause was intended
to prevent feuds between sovereignties by forcing each of the states into
a position of accomodation in behalf of the nation.
Note, Mexican Bilateral Divorce-A Catalyst in Divorce Jurisdiction Theory?, 61
Nw. U.L. REV. 584, 587 n.20 (1966) [hereinafter referred to as Mexican Bilateral
Divorce]. See also H. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 45-47 (1959).
" "Writers and most courts agree that all that is meant by comity is that the
state of the forum is not obliged by any superior power or force to apply foreign
law." STIMSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS 71 (1963).
159 U.S. 113 (1895).
Id. at 163-64.
17 Id. at 165. See also Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889
(1943).
'8 Public policy generally refers to the morality, conscience, and public good
of a state as exemplified in its state constitution, legislative statutes, and judicial
opinions. See, e.g., Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944);
Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), afl'd
42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964); Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296, 12 N.E.2d 305
(1938); and In re Estate of Steffke, 65 Wis. 2d 199, 222 N.W.2d 628 (1974).
This defense has been categorized into the following areas that have been
used to defeat the effects of foreign judgments: (1) insufficient authentication or
proof of a foreign judgment; (2) lack of finality of a foreign judgment; (3) lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction in the foreign forum; (4) lack of personal jurisdiction of
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American courts generally use this defense to deny comity
when jurisdictional requirements for a foreign divorce have
not been met,"' some courts have also denied comity on the
ground that comity does not require recognition of a foreign
judgment, even in the absence of any enumerated defense.'0
Thus, the application of comity to foreign divorces re-
mains distinct from the principle of full faith and credit
found in domestic sister-state divorces.'
(2) Comity and the Restatements of Conflict of Laws
Although the original Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws (1934) contains no black-letter rule dealing
with the recognition of foreign judgments,"" Section 98 of
the second Restatement states a general policy favoring for-
eign judgment recognition,' but the scope of this recogni-
tion differs from the recognition given to sister-state
judgments.'4
the foreign forum; (5) insufficiency of notice or opportunity to be heard; (6) pro-
curement of the foreign judgment by extrinsic fraud; (7) clear mistake of fact or
law made by the foreign court in its judgment; and (8) the foreign judgment con-
travenes the public policy of the recognition forum. See Peterson, Res Judicata
and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 308-10 (1963) and author-
ity cited therein.
" See infra notes 62-79 and accompanying text.
'0 See, e.g., Perdikouris v. S.S. Olympos, 185 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1960),
Bittson v. Bittson, 7 A.D.2d 868, 182 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1959) and Fantony v. Fantony,
21 N.J. 525, 122 A.2d 593 (1956). This approach, however, has been severely criti-
cized and largely discredited for allowing a "selective" recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments at the expense of general reciprocity. See Peterson, Res
Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHio ST. L.J. 291, 294 (1963);
Smith, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States,
9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44, 49-50 (1962), and authority cited therein.
21 This distinction is important, since some courts have made the mistake of
applying full faith and credit recognition, instead of comity, to foreign divorces.
See, e.g., Clagett v. King, 308 A.2d 245 (D.C. 1973).
"' Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. Rv. 220, 222 (1972).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971) states: "A valid
judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned."
21 RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) O CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment b (1971) em-
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Likewise, although Section 117 of the second Restate-
ment provides that public policy defenses may be fore-
closed as a matter of full faith and credit law in interstate
cases,2 ' Comment c to Section 117 emphasizes that Ameri-
can courts may still use public policy defenses in foreign
cases involving coMity.2 Utilization of this public policy de-
fense is also in accord with the first Restatement view.2 7
The Restatements thus provide continued recognition
of comity principles established by earlier judicial prece-
dent, 8 and although the Restatements do not constitute
mandatory authority in the United States, their continuing
recognition of comity and its policy defenses evidence cur-
rent scholarly support for these theories---especially since
phasizes that "[Jludgments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the
protection of full faith and credit," and comment c to the same section states:
A foreign nation judgment will not be recognized in the United States
unless the American court is conviced that the foreign court had juris-
diction and that 'there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial
upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of
the defendant. . . and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it is sitting, or fraud in
procuring the judgment. . . .' Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
If these conditions are met, the judgment will not be refused recognition
on the ground that the rendering court made an error of law or fact
(emphasis added).
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971) provides: "A
valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States will be recognized and
enforced in a sister state even though the strong public policy of the latter State
would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim."
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 comment c (1971)
states:
Judgments rendered in foreign nations are not entitled to the protection
of full faith and credit. A State of the United States is therefore free to
refuse enforcement to such a judgment on the ground that the original
claim on which the judgment is based is contrary to its public policy. A
judgment rendered in a foreign nation, however, will, if valid, usually be
given the same effect as a sister state judgment (see § 98). (emphasis
added).
See also Peterson, supra note 22, at 252-53.
17 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) provides: "No action can
be maintained upon a cause of action created in another state the enforcement of
which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum."
'5 See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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judges and legal scholars in many foreign nations place
heavy reliance on this work of the American Law
Institute."
(3) Comity for Non-Judicial Foreign Divorces
Foreign judicial divorces will generally be recognized by
American courts under the theory of comity, if not against
the public policy of the recognition state. s° But will these
comity principles be equally valid for non-judicial foreign
divorces, such as Danish administrative divorces or Jewish
Ghet divorces? The answer appears to be an affirmative
one,"1 although subject to the same public policy defenses
as would apply to foreign judicial divorces.82
Comity therefore has been found applicable in recog-
nizing "quasi-executive" Danish administrative divorces;"
and Jewish Ghet divorces have been recognized by Ameri-
can courts when performed by rabbis in a foreign nation
which recognizes Jewish religious communities as self-gov-
erning, and where the Ghet divorce is legally binding on its
Jewish citizens.8 '
" See Peterson supra note 22, at 266, and see, e.g., Duncan, Foreign Divorces
Obtained on the Basis of Residence, and the Doctrine of Estoppel, 9 IRISH JUlRST
59, 62 (1974). There are, however, current critics of the Restatement who feel the
First and Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws are both too rigid in their dis-
regard for interstate and multistate societal needs and practicalities. See, e.g.,
Ehrenzweig, American Conflict Law in Its Historical Perspective: Should the Re-
statement be "Continued"., 103 U. PA. L. REV. 133 (1954) and Ehrenzweig, The
Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 1230 (1965).
See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
" In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894), for example, the Supreme
Court stressed that comity recognition may be given to "the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation" (emphasis added).
3, See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Well v. Poulsen, 121 Conn. 281, 184 A. 580 (1936) (applying New
York law);-Hansen v. Hansen, 255 A.D. 1016, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1938); and Sorenson
v. Sorenson, 219 A.D. 344, 220 N.Y.S. 242 (1924). These cases involved a royal
decree of divorce from the Danish King, upon application to the Danish counsel in
New York.
3 See, e.g., In re Rubenstein's Estate, 143 Misc. 917, 257 N.Y.S. 637 (Sup. Ct.
1932) and Miller v. Miller, 70 Misc. 368, 128 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
1982-83]
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However, these Ghet divorces will not be recognized if
performed in the United States when the parties are Ameri-
can domiciliaries. The rationale behind this rule is that
when a person seeking a divorce is domiciled within an
American state's jurisdiction, only state law controls a per-
son's domestic relations, and religious laws have no effect
on state sovereignty.3 5 This rationale has been applied to
other religious divorces as well. 6
Comity should therefore be given to non-judicial as
well as judicial foreign divorces if such divorces are not
against the recognizing state's strong public policy; but non-
judicial divorces of American domiciliaries will not be rec-
ognized unless the parties have complied with their own
state's duly enacted divorce laws.3 7
(4) Comity and Res Judicata
Res judicata is the legal principle that parties to an ac-
tion should not be allowed to relitigate the merits of a case
already settled-or which could have been settled-in the
original proceeding. Very broadly stated, the guiding princi-
ple of res judicata is that there should be an end to litiga-
tion after the parties have had a fair chance to present their
claims; 'a and the legal object behind this principle is to
avoid harrassment of the successful party, to end litigation,
and to bring some form of predictability and uniformity to
the law through the finality and conclusiveness of
judgments.3 9
35 See In re Goldman's Estate, 156 Misc. 817, 282 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Chertok v. Chertok, 208 A.D. 161, 203 N.Y.S. 163 (1924) and cf. Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190 (1888).
31 See, e.g., Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 69 P. 660 (1902) (refusal to rec-
ognize a Mormon religious divorce when Utah territorial statutes were not uti-
lized). Cf. Romney v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) and Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (bigamy cases).
37 See generally, Note, United States Recognition of Foreign, Nonjudicial
Divorces, 53 MINN. L. REV. 612 (1969).
38 See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
406-07 (1968).
39 It is not the policy of the law to encourage litigation, and where a
[Vol. 21
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When this intrastate theory of res judicata is extended
to sister states, it merges with the full faith and credit re-
quirement and produces a powerful ordering of legal rela-
tions within the United States-including divorce. 0 For ex-
ample, under this combination of res judicata and full faith
and credit a state must give recognition to the final judg-
ments of sister states, even though the first judgment is
clearly against the strong public policy of the second fo-
rum."1 In addition, the policy of res judicata combined with
full faith and credit is so strong that a state's judgment
must be recognized by sister states, even though the judg-
ment is based on a clear mistake of fact or law.' 2 Therefore,
if the parties appearing in a bilateral divorce action in State
A do not question State A's jurisdiction in the original pro-
ceeding, under the mandates of res judicata and full faith
and credit-they will not be allowed to relitigate this juris-
dictional question in State B."5 A defendant who does not
court of competent jurisdiction, having the parties legally before it, has
adjudicated the merits of their case, every reason favors holding them
bound by the adjudication where the judgment may be called in ques-
tion, if there has been no fraud practiced in obtaining it.
Glass v. Blackwell, 48 Ark. 50, 55, 2 S.W. 247, 259 (1886) quoted in R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 73 n.17 (1968).
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 (1971) states, for exam-
ple: "A spouse who was personally subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the di-
vorce state, and those in privity with him, may be precluded by application of the
rules of res judicata of the divorce state from thereafter attacking the decree
collaterally."
4 E.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908), applied in Wallihan v.
Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954) (recognition of Nevada divorce and
separation agreement although it violated Virginia's strong public policy). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1971) supra, note 25. Com-
ment b to § 117 states in pertinent part:
As between States of the United States, the rule of this Section is one of
Constitutional law. Provided that the judgment is valid (see § 92), full
faith and credit requires that it be recognized and enforced in a sister
State even though the original claim is contrary to the strong public
policy of the sister State.
42 See, e.g., Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964) and Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U.S. 230 (1908).
" See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378
(1948), and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). "As between States of the
United States, this [res judicata] result is required by full faith and credit." RE-
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appear in an ex parte divorce action to litigate the merits of
the case, however, may later question the divorce court's
jurisdiction."
Foreign country divorces do not have this res judicata
finality mandated by the full faith and credit clause.
Rather, they are recognized under the principles of comity4
and are subject to public policy defenses.46 What this
means is that American courts may always question the ju-
risdiction, or the merits, of an American domiciliary's for-
eign country divorce.
This apparent freedom of American courts, under the
principles of comity, to summarily reject the res judicata
finality of foreign divorces with or without cause47 has come
under criticism.48 While admitting that the amalgam of
comity and its enumerated defenses still reflect the status
of American case law today,49 critics sharply attack the ju-
dicial discretion involved in deciding whether or not to ap-
ply comity5" and they strongly disapprove of the "doctrine
of retaliation."51 They further argue that foreign judgments
STATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 comment b (1971). For res judicata to
be effective, however, the divorce state must also comply with the requirements of
due process. Id.
11 See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949) and Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945).
45 See supra notes 14-17, 24 and accompanying text.
46 See supra notes 18-20, 26-27 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 18 and 20.
" See, e.g., Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783 (1950); Smit, International Res Judicata and Col-
lateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44 (1962); and Peterson,
Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1963).
" See Peterson supra note 48, at 294.
60 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
" The "doctrine of retaliation," first set out in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1859), permits the denial of comity recognition to foreign court judgments if the
law of that foreign country would not recognize a corresponding American judg-
ment. This doctrine has received scant approval from commentators, and is not
binding on state courts. Many state courts and a majority of federal courts have
refused to follow this "doctrine of retaliation." See R. LFnLAR, AMERICAN CON-
FLICTS LAW 171-72 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1934)
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 comment e (1971), both
[Vol. 21
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should be presumed res judicata-absent certain excep-
tions-and that res judicata, rather than comity, should be
the real basis for recognition of foreign judgments. 2
Professor Smit, for example, argues that foreign judg-
ments involving questions of status or a determination of
property interests, 3 should be given conclusive res judicata
effect, but he believes that foreign in personam judgments
should be given no binding effect at all if rendered against
non-domiciliaries of the judgment forum." Professor Peter-
son takes the concept of res judicata for foreign country
judgments one step further, arguing that under a policy-ori-
ented approach all foreign country judgments should be
presumed res judicata unless there is an independent de-
fense to reject these judgments-a defense that is distinct
from the recognition rationale of comity. Such independent
defenses, argues Peterson, would include: lack of jurisdic-
tion;5 5 insufficiency of notice or opportunity to be heard
(which would also include gross unfairness of foreign law,
and the failure to authenticate a foreign judgment);" and
possibly the "mixed defenses" of extrinsic fraud5" and mis-
take of law or fact. 8 The rationale behind these first two
defenses is that there must be a minimum of fairness to the
litigants,5 9 and thus the question of whether the foreign
court had jurisdiction must ultimately be tested by the no-
tions of fairness held by the court of the recognition fo-
rum. 0 With the exception of the "mixed defense" of mis-
take of law or fact, Professor Peterson's theory appears to
be fairly consistent with the second Restatement's
disapproving the "doctrine of reciprocity."
See Reese, supra note 48, at 784-85.
See Smit, supra note 48, at 64-67.
See Smit, supra note 48, at 68.
See Peterson, supra note 48, at 310-11.
See Peterson, supra note 48, at 310.
See Peterson, supra note 48, at 317-18.
'8 See Peterson, supra note 48, at 317-18.
" See Peterson, supra note 48, at 310.
6o See Peterson, supra note 48, at 311.
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approach."
Regarding these principles of comity and res judicata,
this writer would agree with Professor Peterson that a se-
lective, and seemingly haphazard, judicial approach to com-
ity and its enumerated defenses definitely warrants further
evaluation and revision (beyond the scope of this Article) in
order to create a more uniform and predictable body of law
that, at the same time, reflects the current needs of our so-
ciety and other interacting societies.
Whether the recognition of foreign judgments is prima-
rily based on the theory of comity and its enumerated de-
fenses as present case law indicates, or whether it should be
based on the presumption of res judicata as various com-
mentators suggest, the important legal principle inherent in
both theories continues to be that a lack of jurisdiction and
a fundamental lack of fairness to the litigants are valid de-
fenses to the recognition of any foreign country judgment,
including foreign divorces. This principle is demonstrated
below.
B. The Domiciliary Requirement for Divorce Jurisdiction
(1) The General Rule
It is a well established principle of American law that,
whether it be in a sister state or a foreign nation, domicile
62
61 See supra note 24.
62 "Domicile" is usually defined as being the place where the plaintiff is phys-
ically present with the intent of making that place his or her home. See H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286 (1968); A.
EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72 (1962); Fiske v. Fiske, 48 Wash. 2d 69, 290
P.2d 725 (1955). "Domicile" differs from "residence" since with "domicile" there
is a subjective intent to remain more or less permanently in a certain place, and
this intent need not be present for "residence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 70-72 (1971). As a jurisdictional requirement for divorce, how-
ever, "legal residence" usually means "domicile." H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286 (1968); Cooper v. Cooper, 269 Cal. App.
2d 6, 74 Cal. Rptr. 439, 441 (1969); Tower v. Tower, 120 Vt. 213, 138 A.2d 602
(1958). But see Garrison v. Garrison, 107 Ill. App. 2d 311, 246 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1969).
Numerous courts remain confused with this distinction between "domicile" and
"residence." See, e.g., 13 WEST'S WORDS AND PHRASES Domicile pp. 423-98 (1965).
[Vol. 21
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is the only basis for divorce jurisdiction. Over one hundred
years ago, in the case of Pennoyer v. Neff,e3 the Supreme
Court stated: "The [domiciliaryl State . . . has absolute
right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage
relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the
causes for which it may be dissolved. ' '64 The rationale be-
hind this important rule was restated by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in the case of Williams v. North Carolina [IIJ:5
Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a di-
vorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil
.... The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this
jurisdictional prerequisite, and since 1789 neither this Court nor
any other court in the English-speaking world has questioned it.
Domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such per-
manence as to control the creation of legal relations and respon-
sibilities of the utmost significance."
Compare the definitions of "domicile" and "residence" in the First Restatement:
The word "residence" is often but not always used in the sense of domi-
cil, and its meaning in a legal phrase must be determined in each case. It
is sometimes used as the equivalent to "domicil." . . . On the other
hand, it may mean something less than domicil .... The phrase "legal
residence" is sometimes used as the equivalent of domicil.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 comment e (1934).
6 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 734-35 (dictum). This principle was also restated with approval in
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). The Sosna court further stated that a
domiciliary requirement for divorce "additionally furthers the State's parallel in-
terests both in avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another State
has a paramount interest, and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce
decrees to collateral attack." Id. at 407.
05 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
Id. at 229, (dictum), cited with approval in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
407 (1975).
The historical accuracy of this statement has been questioned by at least one
judge in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953) (Hastie, J., dissenting), va-
cated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). Justice Hastie wrote:
The common law courts in England had no divorce jurisdiction at the
time of the American Revolution and I know of none which was exer-
cised by the courts in the North American British colonies ... the rule
that divorce jurisdiction will be exercised only by the courts of a state
which has a domiciliary connection with the spouses is a creation of
nineteenth century American judges.
207 F.2d at 681.
According to another authority, however, the common law rule that
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The principle that domicile is the basis for divorce ju-
risdiction is also recognized in the first6 7 and second"8
Restatements.
jurisdiction in divorce is attributed exclusively to the courts of the dom-
icile of the spouses . . . found its justification in the idea-first devel-
oped in Northwestern Europe during the fourteenth century and has
maintained its relevance to this day-that jurisdiction is to be entrusted
to the courts of the country with which the parties are most closely
connected.
Lipstein, Recognition of Foreign Divorces: Retrospects and Prospects, 2 OTTAWA
L. REV. 49, 53 (1967). The basis for this concept is:
[A] judicial decree of divorce is not merely a judgment which attracts
the common-law rules of the conflict of laws concerning the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments, but affects status. Since status is
governed by the law of the domicile, the courts of the domicile alone can
decide whether the status is to be changed by applying their lex fori or
whatever law their own choice of law rules declare to be applicable.
2 OTrAWA L. REV. 49, at 50.
Whatever the historical accuracy of this rule may be, it is clear that the recent
Supreme Court decision in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), reiterating Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's statement that divorce jurisdiction is founded on domicile,
indicates the Supreme Court is quite satisfied with the legal rationale supporting
this principle. See Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the
No-Fault Era, 58 TEX. L. REV. 501, 522 (1980). See also infra note 106.
67 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 8(2), 110, 111, and 113
(1934). Section 8(2) provides: "All questions concerning the validity of a decree of
divorce are decided in accordance with the law of the domicil of the parties, in-
cluding the Conflict of Laws rules of that state." Section 110 provides that a state
can exercise divorce jurisdiction when both spouses are domiciled in the state, and
Section 113 gives the state jurisdiction when one spouse is domiciled within the
state, and the other spouse is not. As a corollary to this rule, Section 111 provides:
"A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage
when neither spouse is domiciled within the state."
The rationale for the domiciliary principle is that "[miarriage is a status...
an intangible thing . . . of particular interest to the state in which the spouses
have their domicile and where in the great majority of cases the family life is
permanently carried on." RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 110 comment a
(1934).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 70-71 (1971).
Section 70 provides: "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage of spouses both of whom are domiciled in the State," and Section 71
further provides: "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the
marriage of spouses one of whom is domiciled in the state." The rationale for this
rule is "[t]he status of marriage is of peculiar interest to the state in which the
family life of the spouses is carried on." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 70 comment b (1971). But see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 72 (1971), discussed infra in note 92 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the overwhelming majority of American states
will refuse to recognize a foreign divorce, regardless of its
purported validity in the nation awarding it,69 unless at
least one of the spouses was a good-faith domiciliary in the
foreign nation at the time the divorce was rendered.7 0 This
rule applies to foreign bilateral divorces,1 ex parte di-
vorces, 2 and mail-order divorces.7 Under this general prin-
*' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 285 (1971) which pro-
vides: "The local lhw of the domiciliary state in which the action is brought will be
applied to determine the right to divorce." Comment a of § 285 gives the rationale
for this rule:
The state of a person's domicile has the dominant interest in that per-
son's marital status and therefore has judicial jurisdiction to grant him a
divorce . . . . The same considerations which give a state judicial juris-
diction to divorce a domiciliary make it appropriate for the state to ap-
ply its local law to determine the grounds upon which the divorce shall
be granted.
T' See, e.g., Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 896 (1954) (applying Va. law); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 306 F.
Supp. 1177 (N.D. Ala. 1969); Cross v. Cross, 94 Ariz. 28, 381 P.2d 573 (1963);
Schotte v. Schotte, 203 Cal. App. 28, 21 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1962); Kittel v. Kittel, 210
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968); Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1977); Bohaker v.
Koudelka, 333 Mass. 139, 128 N.E.2d 769 (1955); State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1, 118
A.2d 1 (1955); Kugler v. Haitian Tours Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 260, 293 A.2d 706
(1972); Lorenzo v. Lorenzo, 85 N.M. 305, 512 P.2d 65 (1973); Weber v. Weber, 200
Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978); Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d
889 (1943); Commonwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958);
and in re Estate of Steffke, 65 Wis. 2d 199, 222 N.W.2d 628 (1974). See also
authority cited in Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, 1425-29 (1967).
Only four American jurisdictions do not recognize this rule: New York, Con-
necticut, Tennessee, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This minority view is discussed
infra in notes 107-125 and accompanying text.
"' Bilateral divorces are based on the physical presence of both spouses in the
divorcing nation, or physical presence of the petitioner and the voluntary "appear-
ance" by the defendant through an attorney. See, e.g., Warrender v. Warrender,
79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (1963), affd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964)
and Weber v. Weber, 200 Nev. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978).
72 An ex parte divorce is based on the petitioner's physical presence in the
foreign nation, with notice or constructive service given to the absent defendant.
See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969) and
Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
"' A "mail order" divorce is rendered without either party ever appearing in
the foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Chong Jah Alix, 252 F. Supp. 313 (D.C.
Hawaii 1965); Rudnick v. Rudnick, 131 Cal. App. 2d 227, 280 P.2d 96 (1955); and
Butler v. Butler, 239 A.2d 616 (D.C. 1968). "Mail order" and ex parte foreign di-
vorces without domicile are not recognized in any American jurisdiction. See gen-
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ciple, Mexican divorces requiring only residency for foreign-
ers, 7 4 and Dominican and Haitian divorces requiring neither
residency nor domicile, 8 will not be recognized by most
American courts.76
The requirement of domicile for divorce jurisdiction
has been codified in at least ten states77 under the Uniform
Divorce Recognition Act.7 1
The concept that domicile is the only basis for divorce
jurisdiction has been criticized.79 Professor Stimson argues,
erally, Annot. 13 A.L.R.3d 1419, 1429-35 (1967).
74 See supra notes 2, 3 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. It is also important to note
that American courts might also deny recognition to foreign divorces based on
substantive as well as jurisdictional grounds. For example, foreigners in the Do-
minican Republic can be divorced by "mutual consent," and by "mutual and
steady consent" in Haiti. See supra, note 4. In most American jurisdictions, how-
ever, any procurement of divorce by mutual consent without any required marital
fault, incompatibility, or irreconcilable marital breakdown-as required by state
statute-is clearly contrary to a state's strong public policy, and may not be recog-
nized under the principle of comity. See, e.g., Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A.2d 54
(Del. Super. Ct. 1944); Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d 586, 589 (La. App. 1977); and
Smith v. Smith, 79 Mass. 209 (1859).
77 California, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin.
78 The UNIF. DIVORCE RECOGNITION ACT, 9 U.L.A. (1971), provides in part:
§ 1. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony obtained in another juris-
diction shall be of no force or effect in this state, if both parties to the
marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for di-
vorce was commenced.
§ 2. Proof that a person obtaining a divorce from the bonds of matri-
mony in another jurisdiction was (a) domiciled in this state within
twelve months prior to the commencement of the proceeding therefor,
and resumed residence in this state within eighteen months after the
date of his departure therefrom, or (b) at all times after his departure
from this state, and until his return maintained a place of residence
within this state, shall be prima facie evidence that the person was dom-
iciled in this state when the divorce proceeding was commenced.
7' "Jurisdiction for divorce generally has been founded on domicile. The the-
ory that a state or its court has power over a person whose home is in its territory
is unsound." Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the
Domiciliary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956). See also Weintraub, An Inquiry into
the Utility of "Domicile" as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis, 63 MICH. L. REV.
961 (1965) and Garfield, The Transitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-
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for example, that domicile is a variable concept, involving
the conflicting ideas of "permanence and instantaneous
change," based on conflicting inferences of the parties'
domiciliary intent.80 He also questions why full faith and
credit must be given to a sister state divorce where there is
no apparent domicile or jurisdiction"' when a foreign di-
vorce8 2 can be refused recognition for this very reason.as
Professor Stimson concludes that because of these problems
with domicile, divorce jurisdiction should be based on the
physical presence of parties, rather than on their domicile."
One may argue, however, that domicile creates an impor-
tant "nexus" or relationship between the divorcing state
Fault Era, 58 TEx. L. REV. 501 (1980).
80 See Stimson, supra note 79, at 223 (quoting with approval Reese, Does
Domicil Bear a Single Meaning?, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 589 (1955) and the dissenting
opinion of Rutledge, J., in Williams v. North Carolina [II], 325 U.S. 226 (1945)).
81 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953) (applying U.S. Virgin
Islands law), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954). In Alton Judge Goodrich up-
held a lower court decision denying a bilateral Virgin Island divorce to a Connecti-
cut couple because of a lack of evidence the plaintiff was domiciled in the Virgin
Islands. The Virgin Island divorce statute only required "residence," and neither
spouse was complaining. Nevertheless, Judge Goodrich held this was a violation of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment because there was no rational con-
nection between physical presence in the Virgin Islands for six weeks and domi-
cile. Domicile, Judge Goodrich reiterated, was essential to divorce jurisdiction be-
cause domestic relations are a matter of concern to the domiciliary state. Hastie,
J., contested this assumption in his dissenting opinion. See supra note 66. Since
the Altons did not object to this initial divorce, Judge Goodrich's opinion has been
criticized because "the due process clause protects persons, not states" and for
that reason the Alton opinion is "quite unsatisfactory." H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 290 (1968). On the other hand, Judge
Goodrich may have been protecting "those who control affairs in Connecticut" as
the "persons" deprived of due process. 207 F.2d 667, 677. See Garfield, The Tran-
sitory Divorce Action: Jurisdiction in the No-Fault Era, 58 TEX. L. REv. 501, 515
n.89 (1980).
83 "Does the due process clause prohibit what the full faith and credit clause
requires?" Stimson, supra note 80, at 225. Professor Stimson may have overlooked
the fact that cases such as Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), supra note 43,
were decided on the principle of res judicata in combination with full faith and
credit; but in Alton the question of domicile and due process was raised by the
trial court judge, not in a subsequent collateral attack. See supra notes 38-43 and
accompanying text.
' See Stimson, supra note 79, at 294-95.
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and the spouses.85 Mere physical presence in a jurisdiction
and nothing more can never really constitute such a
"nexus." And if recognition of a sister state divorce based
on a sham domicile and thus a lack of jurisdictions' may at
least be partially justified because of the paramount inter-
ests found in the full faith and credit clause,8 7 this rule cer-
tainly should not be extended to include divorces where a
foreign court clearly lacks any semblance of jurisdiction
over American domiciliaries, or where other concepts of
fundamental fairness are absent.88 Nevertheless, at least
four American courts purport to recognize this theory of di-
vorce jurisdiction based on physical presence alone.8 9
Professor Weintraub is another critic who believes that
"technical domicile" should not be a constitutional prereq-
uisite to divorce jurisdiction. But where Professor Stimson
suggests only physical presence for divorce jurisdiction,"
Professor Weintraub argues for a more significant contact
between the forum and the spouses in order to give the
state a reasonable, and legitimate, interest in affecting the
marital status-for example, a requirement of a "substan-
tial period of residence" as is found in servicemen's divorce
statutes.91 The second Restatement also provides that a
substantial period of residence, as well as domicile, may be
" See supra notes 62-67, 76-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
87 See supra notes 13, 25, 41 and 43 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 14-27, 62-78 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 107-125 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
"l See Weintraub, supra note 79, at 982-83. Servicemen's divorce statutes, ap-
plicable only to service personnel and their spouses, generally require domicile or
residence for divorce jurisdiction. E.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 580.1 (Supp. 1981);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.075(2) (1981); and VA. CODE § 20-97 (Supp. 1981). The rea-
son for this exception to the general rule requiring domicile for divorce jurisdic-
tion is that a military service family is often reassigned from place to place in the
course of a military career, and lacking the freedom of choice to establish a new
domicile, their domicile is likely to remain the place of military enlistment-where
the spouses no longer reside. Physical presence is not enough for divorce jurisdic-
tion under these statutes, since a residency nexus must be established in most
states that have enacted these statutes. See Note, Conflict of Laws: Limitations
on the "Domicile of Choice" of Military Servicemen, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 167 (1978).
[Vol. 21
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an adequate prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction."'
A "substantial" residency requirement of six months to
a year may well be a significant enough relationship or
"nexus" to reasonably and legitimately allow for divorce ju-
risdiction in addition to the traditional requirement of
domicile; and examples of this residency rule are clearly
justified in servicemen's divorce cases.93 Indeed, the exact
distinctions between "residence" and "domicile" are not al-
ways clear.9 4
Yet any further expansion of these jurisdictional excep-
tions should be weighed and evaluated through a case-by-
case approach and any jurisdictional modifications other
than domicile should only be made if and when demonstra-
ble legal and societal needs are seriously affected.
For example, a recent critic of the domiciliary require-
ment for divorce jurisdiction, Professor Garfield, argues
that in our current transient society with no-fault divorce,
the domiciliary requirement is obsolete because "the prob-
lem today is not so much migratory divorce as migratory
people."9 5 Accordingly, she recommends a proposed Uni-
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72 (1971) provides: "A state
has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses,
neither of whom is domiciled in the state, if either spouse has such a relationship
to the state as would make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage."
Comment a to § 72 reiterates a state "should not dissolve the marriage of spouses
in whom it has little or no interest" and that a state may not exercise divorce
jurisdiction "if neither spouse is domiciled in the state and if the state does not
have sufficient interest in either spouse or some other basis to justify interference
with the marriage status." Comment b to § 72 suggests, however, that the domicile
of one or both of the spouses under §§ 70 and 71 is not the only possible basis of
divorce jurisdiction, and that residence, as distinguished from domicile, "in the
state for a substantial period, such as a year, is an adequate jurisdictional basis."
Under this Restatement view, Mexican divorces requiring six months resi-
dency for foreigners (see supra note 2) might qualify for comity recognition; but,
except for servicemen's divorce statutes (see supra note 92), most American juris-
dictions have not yet modified their domiciliary requirement for divorce jurisdic-
tion (see supra notes 63-74 and 83).
" See supra note 91.
' See supra note 62.
96 Garfield, supra note 79, at 504.
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form Divorce Jurisdiction Act which would provide as the
basis for divorce jurisdiction the mere presence of both par-
ties in a state for bilateral divorces; and a brief period of
presence, or simple residence in the forum state, for ex
parte divorces." Professor Garfield suggests few compelling
reasons for changing domiciliary requirements for divorce
jurisdiction. She admits that migratory divorces are no
longer the problem they once were due to an increase in no-
fault jurisdictions,' 7 and there is much truth in this asser-
tion.'8 What compelling social needs would be served, then,
See Garfield, supra note 79, at 544.
"With the passing of fault as the sole ground for divorce, the need for the
escape hatch of divorce mills necessarily has diminished. There is no reason to
travel to Nevada (or Haiti or the Dominican Republic] for what is readily availa-
ble at home for a fraction of the cost." Garfield, supra note 79 at 504. She does
add "for those seeking instant release, the lure of a quickie divorce remains." Id.
n.15.
Among no-fault divorce grounds, six states recognize incompatibility as a
legitimate ground for divorce: ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110
(1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601 (Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-2 (Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (West
1981). At least twenty-six jurisdictions now recognize divorce based on "irreconcil-
able differences" or "irretrievable breakdown": Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312
(Supp. 1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4508 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
106 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-32 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1505
(Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 30.102
(Supp. 1981) HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-41 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-603
(Supp. 1981); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-3 (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.17
(West Supp. 1981); Ky. Rzv. STAT. § 403.140 (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 691 (Supp. 1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.6 (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06
(West Supp. 1982); Nn. Rzv. STAT. § 42-361 (Supp. 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.7-2 (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-03 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.025 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1 (1981); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 3.01
(Vernon 1975); V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 16, § 104 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.030 (Supp. 1982). And fifteen jurisdictions, including New York, grant no-
fault dissolutions after the parties have lived apart for some statutory period:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24, 26 (Supp.
1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.34-2 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170
(McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-5, 50-6 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1981); P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 31 § 321 (Supp. 1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-801
(Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-1, 30-3-2 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §§ 551, 631 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 20-91 (Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-4
(Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.07 (West 1981); WYo. STAT. § 20-2-104 (1977).
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by changing this domiciliary test to require only physical
presence of the parties? Professor Garfield argues that tran-
sient spouses, moving to a new home state, might be
"barred" from obtaining a divorce since they are not yet
domiciliaries of the new state."9 But this is not altogether
true.100 Furthermore, if there is an important nexus be-
tween a new resident and the state, related to state and lo-
cal police protection, property rights, rights of inheritance,
taxes, voting rights, education, "new jobs, new environ-
ments, new opportunities, and the chance to start a new
life," this nexus should relate to the parties' marital status
Thus, in at least 47 American jurisdictions a type of no-fault divorce ground now
exists, and most American domiciliaries no longer need to rely on "quickie" for-
eign divorces to give them grounds they could not obtain in their own state. Ap-
parently Illinois is the only state retaining fault grounds as an exclusive remedy
for divorce. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 1 401 (Smith-Hurd 1980). See generally Note,
Caribbean Divorce for Americans: Useful Alternative or Obsolescent Institution?,
10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 116, 119-20 (1976).
[Pleople are increasingly mobile for reasons other than easy divorce
. . . . It is much more likely that spouses contemplating divorce will
leave their home states, not in search of lax divorce laws, but in search
of new jobs, new environments, new opportunities, and a chance to start
a new life. A move to another state may be perfectly honest, natural,
and beneficial. Yet when a person in this situation attempts to secure a
divorce in his (or her) new home, he may find himself barred from the
courthouse by rules designed to meet the migratory divorce problems of
a bygone era.
Garfield, supra note 79, at 504.
The Supreme Court, as a constitutional mandate, has upheld certain do-
mestic rights of individuals against arbitrary and unreasonable state statutes.
There is, for example, a fundamental right to marry (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)) and a fundamental right to
divorce (Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)). Following these precedents,
the argument has been made that a domiciliary requirement for divorce jurisdic-
tion would also violate a petitioner's due process rights under the fourteenth
amendment by "barring" his or her access to a divorce if he or she were not yet a
state domiciliary. But in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Supreme Court
upheld Iowa's one year domiciliary requirement for divorce, stating Sosna's claim
was not a total deprivation of the right to divorce, as in Boddie v. Connecticut,
but only one of delay. The Iowa domiciliary requirement could be met in a matter
of time, and was sufficiently related to establish a nexus between appellant Sosna
and the right of the State of Iowa to control domestic relations and responsibili-
ties "of the utmost significance." See also, supra notes 64, 66 and accompanying
text.
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as well.101 Thus, it continues to serve an important function
through married life and upon divorce.
10 2
It might finally be argued that since various states can
now obtain personal jurisdiction in divorce matters through
state long-arm statutes,108 the concept of marital domicile
for divorce jurisdiction is no longer relevant. However,
'", "Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has
always been subject to the control of the legislature." Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
190, 205 (1888);
As this Court on more than one occasion had recognized, marriage in-
volves interests of basic importance in our society .... Even where all
substantive requirements are concededly met, we know of no instance
where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate them-
selves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage
... without invoking the State's judicial machinery.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (citations omitted).
101 [A] residency requirement may reasonably be justified on grounds
other than purely budgetary considerations or administrative conve-
nience. A decree of divorce is not a matter in which the only interested
parties are the State as a sort of "grantor," and a divorce petitioner such
as appellant in the role of the "grantee." Both spouses are obviously
interested in the proceedings, since it will affect their marital status and
very likely their property rights. Where a married couple has minor chil-
dren, a decree of divorce would usually include provisions for their cus-
tody and support. With consequences of such moment riding on a di-
vorce decree issued by its courts, [a state] may insist that one seeking to
initiate such a proceeding have the modicum of attachment to the State
required here.
Such a requirement additionally furthers the State's parallel inter-
ests both in avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another
State has a paramount interest, and in minimizing the susceptibility of
its own divorce decrees to collateral attack.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1975) (citation omitted).
103 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015(a)(12) (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. 34-2446
(Supp. 1981); CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
48.193(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 5-514(e) (1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. R. TRIAL P. 4.4(A)(7)
(West Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (1976); MICH. COUP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.705(7) (1981); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16(A)(5) (1978); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 314(1) (McKinney 1972); NEv. REv. STAT. § 14.065(2)(e) (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(7) (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 14.035(2)
(1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-50 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
214(a)(7) (1980); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.26(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(6) (1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1(A)(9) (Supp. 1981);
and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(11) (West Supp. 1981).
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these long-arm statutes generally require that the parties
have maintained a marital domicile in the forum state at
the time they separate; and that the initial grounds for di-
vorce or legal separation are also based in the forum
state.'"' Moreover, the forum state is barred from using its
long-arm statute in any domestic relations matter unless
the state has a significant relationship with the parties.1 0 5
The domiciliary requirement for divorce jurisdiction
thus remains a reasonable and viable legal concept, and
should not be modified unless there is a clearly demon-
strated need.'"
-o See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-328.1(A)(9) (Supp. 1981).
105 See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
'" By way of comparison, other countries continue to recognize this domicili-
ary requirement for divorce jurisdiction, although alteinate residence require-
ments have also recently emerged.
Prior to 1974, for example, the divorce jurisdiction of English courts was
based on domicile as a "rigid principle." Latey, Recognition of Foreign Decrees of
Divorce, 16 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 982 (1967). While still retaining domicile as a ju-
risdictional basis for divorce, Parliament passed the Domicile and Matrimonial
Proceedings Act of 1973 which also permitted English divorce courts to exercise
jurisdiction if either party has been a resident in England for at least one year
preceding commencement of the divorce; and abolished the common-law rule that
a wife's domicile is always dependent on her husband.
The Republic of Ireland has no such legislation. Under common-law princi-
ples, the Irish Supreme Court will recognize foreign domicile-based divorces, but
recognition of foreign divorces based on residence is still doubtful. Duncan, For-
eign Divorces Obtained on the Basis of Residence and the Doctrine of Estoppel, 9
IRISH JURIST 59, 62-64 (1974).
The Prague Convention of the International Law Association in 1947 pro-
posed three alternate bases of jurisdiction for divorce: (1) domicile; (2) habitual
residence; or (3) nationality. Latey, supra, at 995. This is the same test recom-
mended at the 1968 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention
on Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees. Nadelmann, Habitual Residence and
Nationality as Tests at the Hague: The 1968 Convention on Recognition of Di-
vorces, 47 TEx. L. Rv. 766, 771 (1969).
See also North, Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees, 31 MOD. L. Rav. 257
(1968) and Note, Conflict of Laws: Foreign Divorce Decrees: Validity: Domicile of
Husband: Whether Validity of Divorce To Be Determined By "Real and Sub-
stantial Connection" Test: Holub v. Holub [19761 5 W.W.R. 527, 71 D.L.R.(3d)
698 (Man. C.A.), 9 OTTAwA L. Rav. 676 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Foreign
Divorce Decrees].
Nowhere in these countries is divorce jurisdiction based on mere physical
presence alone.
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(2) The Minority "New York Rule"
To date, only four American jurisdictions 0 7 do not rec-
ognize the principle that domicile is the basis for divorce
jurisdiction. Instead, their test for jurisdiction in bilateral
divorces is based solely on physical presence, and these four
jurisdictions will therefore recognize a foreign bilateral di-
vorce without any finding of residence or domicile. 0 8 Since
such divorces lack any significant connection with the di-
vorcing forum-either through domicile or resi-
dency-which is a major defect in itself;109 and since there
is very little (if any) common law or foreign legal precedent
to support such a theory;1 0 this writer must conclude, with
other commentators,1 that this minority rule is of doubt-
ful legal precedent, and should not be followed by other
jurisdictions.
The case of Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel1 provides an ex-
ample of this questionable theory's application. Although
prior New York decisions were in conflict as to whether or
not domicile was a prerequisite to divorce jurisdiction,1
the New York Court of Appeals in Rosenstiel liberally in-
terpreted some unique statutory law1 4 and held that recog-
107 New York, Connecticut, U.S. Virgin Islands and Tennessee.
108 See, e.g., Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969) (applying Virgin
Islands law to a Mexican divorce); Yoder v. Yoder, 31 Conn. Supp. 344, 330 A.2d
825 (1974) (Mexican divorce); Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d
709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966) (Mexican divorce);
and Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978) (Dominican divorce).
'" See supra notes 63-105 and accompanying text.
'1 See supra notes 63-66, 106 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosen-
stiel, and Borax, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 26 (1966); Leach, Divorce by Plane-Ticket in
the Affluent Society-With a Side Order of Jurisprudence, 14 KAN. L. REv. 549
(1966); and Mexican Bilateral Divorce, supra note 13. But see Comment, Divorce
by Personal Jurisdiction of the Parties-A Support of the Mexican Bilateral Di-
vorce, 29 ALB. L. REv. 328 (1965).
" 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 971 (1966).
11 Compare Gray v. Gray, 143 N.Y. 354, 38 N.E. 301 (1894) with Scagg v.
Scagg, 18 N.Y.S. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1892). See also Foster, Recognition of Migratory
Divorces: Rosenstiel v. Section 250, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 429, 432 n.13 (1968).
314 N.Y. DoM. RL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 1977) replaces former §§ 230 and
[Vol. 21
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nition of a bilateral Mexican divorce based on mere physi-
cal presence of the parties "offends no public policy of this
State. ' 115 (Ex parte"l6 and "mail order"11 7 foreign divorces,
however, still remained void as against New York's strong
public policy.11 8) The dissent in Rosenstiel made various
persuasive arguments against this decision: (1) domicile is
the sine qua non of jurisdiction over the marital status, and
the State is a participant having a vital interest in this sta-
tus;1 9 (2) based on this domiciliary requirement, no other
states recognize the New York rationale; (3) such divorces
are blatantly and obviously the fruit of consensual arrange-
ments forbidden by New York public policy; 20 (4) although
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution forces
sister states to recognize Nevada divorces based on a six-
weeks residence, the Constitution has no application to di-
vorce decrees of foreign nations,12 1 and therefore to analo-
gize a one-day Juarez Mexican divorce to a six-week Ne-
vada divorce is "too facile"; (5) the fact that some parties
choose to treat their marriage contracts with the same in-
difference they treat commercial contracts does not mean
the judiciary should endorse such conduct; and (6) no court
is licensed to override a public policy declared by the
170. Until 1966, the New York legislature conferred divorce jurisdiction without
regard to domicile where the marriage ceremony had been performed in New
York, and by "judicial gloss," the legislative failure to use the term "domicile" was
interpreted by the courts to mean "residence" as "physical presence." See gener-
ally Foster, supra note 114 at 431-33.
"I Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, -, 209 N.E.2d 709, 713, 262
N.Y.S.2d 86, 91 (1965).
" See supra note 72.
"7 See supra note 73.
11 See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, -, 209 N.E.2d 709, 713,
262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 89 (1965). See also Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423
(1943).
"' See supra notes 63-105 and accompanying text. The dissent also pointed
out that the majority had not sufficiently distinguished the rationale behind Cald-
well v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948).
10 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-311 (McKinney 1978) forbids divorce by mutual
consent by prohibiting any such contract to dissolve a marriage.
" See supra notes 13-47 and accompanying text.
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legislature.'22
The greatest criticism of Rosenstiel by various com-
mentators is that the New York Court of Appeals did in-
deed appear to override state public policy declared by the
New York legislature, not only through a de facto recogni-
tion of divorce by consent,123 but also by allowing New York
migratory couples to evade state divorce law2 4 by obtaining
a foreign decree. Criticism of this judicial usurpation of the
legislative function-regardless of any legislative "wisdom"
inherent in the statutes-has been severe, 25 and is shared
122 See generally Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, -, 209 N.E.2d 709,
715-22, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 92-103 (1965)(dissenting opinion). See also Leach, supra
note 112 at 552.
121 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
'2" At the time of Rosenstiel, divorce grounds in New York were limited to
adultery. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1977) now contains additional
grounds for divorce, including cruelty, abandonment, and separation.
186 E.g.,
[Tihe decision of the Court of Appeals in Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel was
• . . inexcusable, for the court chose to nullify New York Statutes with-
out pretense of constitutional compulsion . . . . If New York's public
policy is to be found in the statutes, the court's statement that recogni-
tion of the Mexican incompatibility decree "offends no public policy of
this state" cannot bear scrutiny. . . . In brief, the Rosenstiel decision
left New York with a divorce law that could satisfy nobody, and it did so
at great cost to the proper relationship between the courts and the
legislature.
Currie, supra note 111, at 57, 59 and 62. "[New York Mexican divorce] decisions
are distinguishable . . . in terms of New York's extremely restrictive divorce law
at the time (divorce for adultery only) and the court's open disapproval of legisla-
tive prudery." H. KRAusE, FAMLY LAW 839 (1976).
The New York [Rosenstiel] decision changes the substantive law of New
York to make divorce by mutual consent a proper basis for the termina-
tion of the marriage.
Even if the approach taken is a clever way for the courts to avoid
the harshness of the statute, it is inappropriate for the courts to assume
this function and adopt this method to bring about the result. No legis-
lature in the United States has yet adopted mutual consent as a statu-
tory basis for divorce, but what the New York courts have done is to
assume the power to sanction it. If the divorce laws do not reflect mod-
ern thinking, and mutual consent ought to be a basis for divorce, then
the laws ought to be revised. But changing [these] laws is a job for the
legislature.
Note, Mexican Bilateral Divorce, supra note 13, at 608.
This same argument might also apply to other states that follow the minority
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by this writer. For the reasons cited above, this author con-
curs with other commentators who believe that the minor-
ity "New York Rule" is of doubtful legal precedent, and
should not be embraced by other jurisdictions.
III. DoES ESTOPPEL "VALIDATE" A VOID FOREIGN DIVORCE
A. The Application of Estoppel Doctrines to Void
Divorces
Assuming that a foreign country divorce decree is void
due to a lack of jurisdiction,1 2 6 a crucial question remains:
Will the doctrine of equitable estoppel serve to "validate" a
void foreign divorce? This question has been analyzed by
various commentators, '1 1 and the courts have reached dif-
ferent results in judicial opinions that appear to be contra-
dictory and confusing.
The source of this confusion is largely based on two
conflicting legal principles. First, as a general principle of
law, a judicial judgment in divorce proceedings-or any
other legal matter-which is given without jurisdiction is
void; and thus is open to collateral attack by the parties
themselves, by interested third parties, or by the state.118
There is, however, another legal principle that one who ob-
tains a judgment, or one who relies on a judgment, may not
collaterally attack it later on jurisdictional grounds; and
this second principle is commonly referred to as "estop-
"New York rule." See, e.g., Recent Developments, Domestic Rela-
tions-Jurisdiction Extension of Comity to Foreign-Nation Divorce, 46 TENN. L.
REV. 238, 249-51 (1978), discussing Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
For another problem related to this "minority rule," see Note, New York-
Approved Mexican Divorces: Are They Valid in Other States?, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
771 (1966).
, See supra notes 62-105 and accompanying text.
IS Among various commentaries discussing estoppel and divorce see H.
CLARK, THE LAW OP DoMEsTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 295-314 (1968);
Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 70 YALE
L.J. 45 (1960); Phillips, Equitable Preclusion of Jurisdictional Attacks on Void
Divorces, 37 FORDHAM L. RaV. 355 (1969); and Rosenberg, How Void is a Void
Decree, or the Estoppel Effect of Invalid Divorce Decrees, 8 FAM. L.Q. 207 (1974).
I" See H. CLARK, supra note 127, at 295 and Clark, supra note 127, at 45-46.
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pel,"12 9 although in divorce cases it sometimes differs from
the technical theory of equitable estoppel." ' In practice
some courts refuse to recognize this estoppel principle for
void divorces,131 while other courts give it only limited
application. " 2
Under what circumstances will American courts invoke
or refuse to invoke estoppel in cases involving void foreign
divorces? A disturbing conflict of authority is discussed be-
low, but two general principles must be emphasized.
First, this particular form of equitable estoppel differs
dramatically from the theory of res judicata, which is some-
times called "estoppel by judgment" or "jurisdictional es-
toppel." Res judicata is a function of the divorce decree it-
self and not the parties' subsequent Conduct. Therefore, the
underlying policy for res judicata is to demand finality in
litigation after the parties have had an opportunity to pre-
sent their case; and in sister state controversies, under the
full faith and credit clause, this res judicata finality is man-
dated even in the absence of jurisdictional prerequisites.133
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, is not a rule of juris-
diction, and is not governed by the full faith and credit
clause in sister state actions or foreign controversies. The
theory of equitable estoppel is dependent upon events and
conduct which occur after the divorce is granted, separate
and apart from the divorce decree itself. It is a personal dis-
Id.
1 This estoppel doctrine:
is broader than the traditional estoppel theory, and for that reason it
has sometimes been called "quasi-estoppel." There is no need, however,
for new terminology as long as we keep in mind that the peculiarities of
matrimonial cases require a more liberal application of this equitable
doctrine. . . . [T]he principle difference in the matrimonial application
is that. . . one party does not necessarily have to rely to his detriment
upon factual representations made by the other party. It is sufficient [in
some cases] that a court finds that it would be unfair to let a party take
advantage of the legal invalidity of the decree.
Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 208 (emphasis in original).
131 See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
132 See infra notes 144, 147 and 152 and accompanying text.
1" See generally supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 21
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ability of the party attacking a void divorce decree, under
the theory that one who has taken a prior position regard-
ing a divorce and has obtained a benefit from it, or one who
has brought about a change of position in the other party,
cannot later take an inconsistent position which would
prejudice the other party.134
Second, the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not le-
gally "validate" a void divorce. Those courts applying the
estoppel concept to void divorces are careful to avoid stat-
ing that such divorces are now "valid," but only that the
attacking party is estopped to assert any invalidity. This
distinction is crucial: although a party may be estopped
from questioning a divorce in certain circumstances, the di-
vorce is still void."'5
How have the courts interpreted and utilized this es-
toppel principle relating to void foreign country divorces?
American courts have generally followed one of four ap-
proaches in determining whether or not estoppel should ap-
ply to a void divorce: (1) the "traditional theory" that gen-
erally refuses to apply an estoppel defense to void divorces
based on public policy grounds; (2) the "sociological the-
ory" that estoppel should be liberally applied to validate
the parties' expectations; (3) the "Restatement theories"
that estoppel should apply to one who has obtained a void
divorce, who remarries in reliance on a void divorce (1st Re-
statement), or whenever there would be "inequitable cir-
cumstances" (2d Restatement); and (4) the "status versus
property rights" theory that estoppel should not be applied
in any divorce controversy involving the parties' marital
status, but that estoppel is appropriate in later controver-
134 See Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 208-09; Clark, supra note 127, at 46-49.
' See H. CLARK, supra note 127, at 297; Clark, supra note 127, at 47 and
Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 208 ("[Tlhe application of estoppel does not imply
that the [divorce] decree is valid legally-on the contrary, many decisions explic-
itly declared a decree invalid and then proceeded to hold one party estopped from
asserting this invalidity.") See, e.g., Packer v. Packer, 6 A.D.2d 464, _ 179
N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1958) and Dunn v. Tiernan, 284 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955).
1982-83]
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sies involving property rights. These four estoppel theories
are analyzed below.
B. The "Traditional Theory" of Estoppel and Void
Divorces
The "traditional theory" of estoppel and void foreign
divorces is for the domiciliary state to reject estoppel, and
to permit collateral attack on the void divorce in all cases
that may arise.136 The rationale behind this rule is that es-
toppel, even for a limited purpose, results in the recognition
of a void migratory divorce granted by a court lacking any
jurisdiction whatever. The domiciliary state should thus ap-
ply its own laws to the marital difficulties of its citizens,137
and if the domiciliary state applied estoppel it would, in ef-
fect, condone an evasion of its divorce laws and counte-
nance an unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs
of its citizens by the unrelated courts of a divorce-mill
jurisdiction.'"
Although one commentator believes that this "tradi-
tional theory" of estoppel is "obsolete" and "no longer de-
fensible," ' recent judicial opinions have held otherwise.
IN See CLARK, supra note 127, at 302-03; Clark, supra note 127, at 53-54; see
also Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A.2d 54 (Del. Super. Ct. 1944). Smith v. Smith, 79
Mass. 209 (1859), Hollingshead v. Hollingshead, 91 N.J. Eq. 261, 110 A. 19 (1920).
Under this theory, a void divorce may be collaterally attacked by the parties
themselves, any interested third parties, or the state.
" See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
' See Phillips, supra note 127, at 363-65.
Since the divorce is a legal nullity, to give it effect is to permit dis-
solutions at the unilateral will of one spouse in the case of an ex parte
divorce . . . [and] likewise, recognition of a void, bilateral divorce
amounts to divorce by consent. This violates the public policy prohibit-
ing [agreements] to alter or dissolve a marriage.
If the divorce is one procured by fraud and perjury as to the plain-
tiff's domicile and the divorce court's jurisdiction, and perhaps to the
grounds alleged as well, to recognize the divorce is to tolerate illegal con-
duct and even make it effectual. Then too, recognition of a void divorce
frequently confers a semblance of legitimacy upon a bigamous second
marriage.
Id. at 364.
I" H. CLARK, supra note 127, at 303; Clark, supra note 127, at 54.
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Indeed, the "traditional theory" remains the law in various
jurisdictions, 40 and where it has effect, domiciliary require-
ments and public policy rationale supersede any kind of es-
toppel argument.4
C. The "Sociological Theory" of Estoppel and Void
Divorces
The "traditional theory" of estoppel and void divorces
has been perceived in some sectors as inequitable to the di-
vorcing parties. Professor Clark has suggested that a "socio-
logical theory" is in its validation of the parties' "real" ex-
pectations of marriage and divorce rather than relying on a
purely theoretical, and perhaps "unreal," legal basis.
Therefore:
if the person attacking the divorce is, in doing so, taking a posi-
tion inconsistent with his past conduct, or if the parties to the
action have relied upon the divorce, and if, in addition, holding
the divorce invalid will unset relationships or expectations
formed in reliance upon the divorce, then estoppel [under the
'sociological view'] will preclude calling the divorce in
question. 4'
Nevertheless, according to another commentator, this
"sociological theory" of estoppel and void divorces has some
weaknesses:
[It can result in uncertainty and ambiguity as to a person's
marital status and his capacity to marry. This is undesirable be-
cause the ambiguity could conceivably lead a person to refrain
140 See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1977); Weber v.
Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978); Kugler v. Haitian Tours Inc., 120
N.J. Super. 260, 293 A.2d 706 (1972); In re Estate of Steffke, 65 Wis. 2d 199, 222
N.W.2d 628 (1974). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 306 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D.
Ala. 1969); Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (1963),
afl'd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964); Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d
928 (1937); and Bobala v. Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940); Com-
monwealth v. Doughty, 187 Pa. Super. 499, 144 A.2d 521 (1958). But see Ferret v.
Ferret, 55 N.M. 565, 237 P.2d 594 (1951) and Davis v. Davis, 80 Ohio Abs. 433,
156 N.E.2d 494 (Ct. Com. Pleas 1959).
"' See generally H. CLARK, supra note 127, at 295-314, and Clark, supra note
127, at 45.
"' H. CLARK, supra note 127, at 305 and Clark, supra note 127, at 56-57.
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from a marriage he could validly contract. More importantly, ju-
dicial ambiguity relative to a person's status can encourage him
to attempt a bigamous marriage he would not attempt in the
face of a forthright determination that his prior marriage sub-
sisted. Then too, estoppel can prevent a valid dissolution of a
prior dead marriage and, consequently, the regularization of a
bigamous remarriage that has been attempted.
1 4 3
D. The Restatement Theories of Estoppel and Void
Divorces
The Conflict of Laws Restatements demonstrate an
evolution in the law of estoppel and void divorces from a
conservative theoretical rule to a more liberal sociological
approach. The first Restatement prohibits the questioning
of a void divorce "either by a spouse who has obtained such
decree of divorce from a court which had no jurisdiction, or
by a spouse who takes advantage of such decree by
remarrying. ' 14
4
-43 Phillips, supra note 127, at 365-66.
144 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT Op LAWS § 112 (1934). Section 112 also has the
following caveat:
[t]he Institute expresses no opinion as to whether a spouse may not
be precluded from questioning the validity of a divorce decree under
circumstances other than those described in this Section; nor is any
opinion expressed as to whether the children of a prior marriage, or a
third person, may be precluded from questioning the validity of a di-
vorce decree under circumstances described in this Section.
Comment b to Section 112 further states: "The rule stated in this Section is
not applicable to prevent a state from prosecuting for bigamy or for unlawful co-
habitation, a person who has obtained a divorce in a state which had no jurisdic-
tion to grant it." This rule has been followed in various states. See, e.g., Long v.
State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949); and State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1, 118 A.2d 1
(1955). There appears to be a conflict of authority as to whether or not the home
state should be able to challenge a foreign divorce if the parties themselves can-
not. Those holding that the state should not be able to challenge a void foreign
divorce include A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT Op LAWS 253 (1962) and H. GOODIuCH,
HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 259 and n.30 (4th ed. 1964). But for an op-
posing view, supporting comment b, see Von Mehren, The Validity of Foreign
Divorces, 45 MAsS. L.Q. 23, 29 (1960); Cavers, Book Review, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 414,
417 (1959); and Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 26, 54-55 n.130 (1966).
For cases holding that third party "strangers" are not estopped from attack-
ing a void divorce, see In re Ainscow's Estate, 34 A.2d 593 (Orphans' Ct. Del.
1943) (third-party children not estopped) and In re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y.
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The second Restatement, apparently influenced by
Professor Clark's "sociological" approach to estoppel and
void divorces, " ' states a more general rule: "A person may
be precluded from attacking the validity of a foreign di-
vorce decree if, under the circumstances, it would be ineq-
uitable for him to do so.''14 There is some uncertainty,
18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1924) (dictum). But for a case holding that a child could not
collaterally attack a parent's void divorce under Florida law to obtain property,
see Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
Cases apparently following § 112 include: Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 796,
221 P.2d 1, 6 (1950) ("the validity of a divorce decree cannot be contested by a
party who has procured the decree or a party who has remarried in reliance
thereon, or by one who has aided another to procure the decree so that the latter
will be free to remarry.") Hensgren v. Silberman, 87 Cal. App. 2d 668, 197 P.2d
356 (1948), Justus v. Justus, 208 Kan. 929, 495 P.2d 98 (1972), and Dennis v.
Dennis, 337 Mass. 1, 147 N.E.2d 828 (1958).
"' Clark's article, supra note 127, is quoted in the Reporter's Note to § 74 of
the Second Restatement.
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT or LAWS § 74 (1971). Comment a to §
74 provides:
Unlike the principle of res judicata (see § 73), application of this estop-
pel doctrine has not to date been held required by any constitutional
mandate. Its applicability in a particular case has been held to be deter-
mined not by the local law of the state in which the divorce was granted
but by the local law of the state in which the validity of the divorce is
attacked. Each State of the United States has been deemed free, at least
within broad limits, to determine the rule's scope and effect ...
The scope of § 74 under comment b further states:
The rule may be applied whenever, under all the circumstances, it would
be inequitable to permit a particular person to challenge the validity of
a divorce decree. Such inequity may exist when action has been taken in
reliance on the divorce or expectations are based on it or when the at-
tack on the divorce is inconsistent with the earlier conduct of the at-
tacking party.
The rule's scope of application varies from state to state and, even
within the confines of a single state, if often clouded with uncertainty.
In general, it may be said that a person who obtains a divorce and then
remarries will not be permitted to attack the validity of the divorce in
order to free himself from his obligations to his second spouse or in or-
der to claim an inheritance from the estate of the first spouse. On the
other hand, if both parties to a divorce attack its validity in a subse-
quent action, neither should be estopped from making such an attack
since neither is placing reliance upon the validity of the divorce. An ex-
ample is where after a husband has obtained an ex parte divorce, the
wife brings an action against him for separation and support, and the
husband in turn seeks to counterclaim for divorce. He should be permit-
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however, as to what constitutes "inequitable circum-
stances," and this may encourage some judicial subjectivity
and not a little confusion.14 7
E. The "Status versus Property Right" Theory of Estop-
pel and Void Divorces
A fourth application of estoppel to void divorces is
based on the nature of the lawsuit itself. If the action is
"matrimonial"-that is to say, if the action deals with mari-
tal status, including actions to declare the nullity of a void
marriage, or separation and divorce-then estoppel is
deemed to be inappropriate. If the action is "non-matrimo-
nial"-that is to say, dealing with a property right such as
ted to do so. The wife is attacking the validity of the divorce in her
action for separation, and there is no reason under the circumstances
why the husband should not be allowed to do the same.
A spouse who has accepted benefits under the divorce will usually
be held estopped to attack it. So an invalid ex parte divorce obtained by
a husband will be held immune from attack by a wife who has remar-
ried. Usually, such a divorce will also be held immune from attack by a
wife who has accepted alimony under the original decree or who has
waited an unreasonably long time before attacking the divorce, particu-
larly if the husband has remarried in the meantime.
Section 74 of the second Restatement thus appears to incorporate Section 112 of
the first Restatement while providing for additional equitable remedies as well.
According to one commentator, "California appears to follow the spirit of the
[second] Restatement more closely than most jurisdictions: estoppel is applied
when equitable considerations demand it and not according to some narrow, legal-
istic rules." Rosenberg, supra note 127 at 213. See also Spellens v. Spellens, 49
Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 261 P.2d 269
(1953); Baker v. Baker, 2 Ill. App. 2d 795, 276 N.E.2d 792 (1971); and Perrenoud
v. Perrenoud, 206 Kan. 559, 480 P.2d 749 (1971).
"' Comment b to Section 74 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT or LAWS
(1971) admits that the rule's scope "varies from state to state and, even within the
confines of a single state, is often clouded with uncertainty." See, e.g., Carroll v.
Carroll, 232 Ark. 997, 342 S.W.2d 79 (1961); Samuel v. McDaniel, 107 N.J. Super.
582, 259 A.2d 714 (1969); In re Shufelt's Estate, 125 Vt. 131, 211 A.2d 173 (1965).
See also Merino v. Merino, 56 Misc. 2d 854, 290 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (Sup. Ct. 1968)
(New York law regarding estoppel and void divorces has created "an edifice of
inconsistency and confusion"), Weber v. Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436,
441 (1978) ("In cases involving foreign divorce decrees . . . the application of the
principles of equitable estoppel cannot be subjected to fixed and settled rules of
universal application, but rests largely on the facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case.")
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taking against a deceased spouse's will, or enforcing an al-
leged right to support-then estoppel may apply.14 8
Although this theory was first suggested in New
York, "4 9 the inconsistent and confusing application of this
rule in that state provides a poor model for analysis, and its
New York application has been severely criticized by nu-
merous commentators.150 But since other common-law pre-
cedent exists involving this theory,"'1 and since other states
have subscribed to it,5 2 the "status versus property right"
theory of estoppel and void divorces should not be dis-
missed due to its unfortunate mishandling in New York.
The major drawback to the "status versus property right"
theory is that "[t]his distinction is sometimes difficult to
apply.' 5
3
F. A Proposed Synthesis of Estoppel Doctrines to Void
Divorces
The above analysis of estoppel relating to void divorces
1,8 See Clark, supra note 127, at 49-50 and Phillips, supra note 127 at 366-68.
See Clark, supra note 127, at 50.
" E.g., "The New York courts, with an ingenuity which would be praisewor-
thy if employed in a socially useful cause, have succeeded in constructing upon
this ostensibly simple [marital status v. property right] distinction an edifice of
inconsistency and confusion unsurpassed elsewhere in the law." Clark, supra note
127, at 50. "[Tlhe case law in New York has little consistency or direction, and it
is virtually impossible to synthesize any clear rules." Rosenberg, supra note 127,
at 213. "The [New York] cases are conflicting and their rationales inconsistent.
Nevertheless, the results in the cases show a fairly consistent pattern." Phillips,
supra note 127, at 356. Cf. Alfaro v. Alfaro, 5 A.D.2d 770, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 943, afl'd,
7 N.Y.2d 949, 165 N.E.2d 880 (1958); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81
N.E.2d 60 (1948); Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943); and
Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d 290 (1940).
"' See, e.g., Downtown v. Royal Trust Co., 34 D.L.R.3d 403 (Can. 1972) and
Hayward v. Hayward, 1 All E.R. 236 (Eng. 1961) cited in 9 OTrAWA L. REv. 676,
685-86 (1977).
" See, e.g., Rabourn v. Rabourn, 385 P.2d 581 (Alaska, 1963); Cross v. Cross,
94 Ariz. 28, 381 P.2d 573 (1963); Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 118, 301
P.2d 1029 (1956); Brown v. Brown, 274 Cal. App. 2d 178, 82 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1969);
and In re Edgett's Estate, 188 Cal. App. 2d 700, 10 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1961); Roman-
ski's Estate, 354 Pa. 261, 47 A.2d 233 (1946); In re Englund's Estate, 45 Wash. 2d
708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954).
"5 Foreign Divorce Decrees, supra note 106, at 685.
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demonstrates no less than four competing theories in Amer-
ican jurisdictions, and a disturbing conflict of intrastate and
interstate legal authority on the subject.1 " What is needed,
writes Professor Phillips, is "the adoption of some rule...
to resolve the present contradictions in the cases, to make
the law predictable and to insure equity."155 Such a rule of
estoppel should ideally combine the predictability and pub-
lic policy rationale of the "traditional" theory and the "sta-
tus versus property right" theory; and at the same time
protect the equitable remedies inherent in the "sociologi-
cal" and Restatement theories. Professor Phillips' sug-
gested rule is: a person should be estopped to attack the
jurisdiction of a divorce court in nonmatrimonial [prop-
erty right] actions if his conduct has made the attack in-
equitable; but any person may attack a divorce in any sub-
sequent matrimonial [status] action.'"
Phillips' rationale for this rule, which follows the "sta-
tus versus property right" concept, is as follows:
Society has a special interest in the marital status of its mem-
bers which justifies the distinction between matrimonial and
other actions. Marriage creates the family upon which society
depends for most of the educational, material, and affective
needs of the great majority of its members.
The social importance of marriage justifies a rule which re-
quires that marital status always be truly adjudicated upon real
facts rather than upon a fictitious divorce. 167 Hence, it is proper
to hold that there can be no estoppel to collaterally attack a
void divorce in matrimonial actions since the estoppel would
prevent a true determination of the marital status in question.
On the other hand, an estoppel could be raised, when appropri-
ate, in non-matrimonial cases concerning a property right in
which society does not have the special interest it has in marital
status. . . .Therefore, a void divorce should not be permitted
See supra note 148. It is little comfort that similar problems exist in Ca-
nada, England, and Ireland. See Foreign Divorce Decrees, supra note 106,
Duncan, supra note 106.
Phillips, supra note 127, at 366.
I d.
167 This rationale appears supportable in fact. See notes 62-77 and 101-06 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 21
HeinOnline  -- 21 J. Fam. L. 46 1982-1983
1982-83] MIGRATORY DIVORCES 47
to influence an adjudication of marital status. Any person
should be permitted to show the nullity of a void decree for the
purpose of adjudicating status as required in separation and di-
vorce actions and in actions for the declaration of the nullity of
a void marriage . . ..
Since the distinction between matrimonial actions and
other types justifies estoppel in non-matrimonial cases, both the
traditionalist and the sociological judge could agree to permit
estoppel in such cases.
The sociologist would also permit estoppel in matrimonial
actions, but the traditionalist would not. The difference results
because the two attach greater importance to and seek the
achievement of different ends. The virtue of the rule rejecting
estoppel is that it results in certainty as to a person's status and
his capacity to marry and, therefore, should tend to encourage
the validation of void marriages. The sociologist recognizes the
undesirability of ambiguity as to marital status which results
when estoppel to avoid inequitably upsetting relationships and
expectations formed in reliance on the putative divorce.
The relationship which the sociologist wishes to avoid up-
setting is a second marriage by a supposed divorcee. But... no
real inequity is involved in a finding that a divorcee's remarriage
is void when the finding is made in a matrimonial action. The
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void even if a court refuses
to so find.1"
Admittedly, a "sociological" judge may be less than
happy that estoppel may not apply to matrimonial "status"
actions under the "synthesis" theory, and a "traditional"
judge may object when estoppel applies to non-matrimonial
property issues; but this rule does attempt, at least, to alle-
viate much of the present judicial uncertainty.
Some legal "sociologists" may argue that to utilize this
proposed estoppel "synthesis" would be inequitable and do
' Phillips, supra note 127, at 367-68 (footnotes omitted). Phillips' rule was
primarily directed at developing some predictability and uniformity in New York
law, but may be applied to many other states as well.
"I Phillips, supra note 127, at 370-71 (footnotes omitted). Again, this ratio-
nale appears factually correct. See notes 133-35 and accompanying text. Indeed, a
good synthesis by analogy is found in the cases of Rabourn v. Rabourn, 385 P.2d
581 (Alaska, 1963) and Unruh v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ariz. 118, 301 P.2d 1029
(1956) which have elements of the "status versus property rights" approach, and
also appear in the Restatement Reporter's Notes.
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a grave injustice to the "de facto spouse," who might learn
after a collateral attack on a void divorce that he or she is
no longer a "legal spouse," although that was the real and
present expectation of the parties. An answer to this legiti-
mate concern is that the "de facto spouse" would have al-
ternate remedies. For example, many states now provide al-
imony provisions on annulment as well as on divorce. 1"
The "de facto spouse" might also have an action for unjust
enrichment,1" for a partnership or quasi-partnership, " or
for a contract action resulting from unmarrieds living to-
gether.1as Laches might also be a valid defense.'" Finally,
the last-in-time marriage presumption generally places the
burden of proving there was no valid divorce on the attack-
ing party rather than the last-in-time spouse, and this is a
strong presumption to overcome.165
In short, there are alternate equitable remedies to pro-
tect the "de facto spouse"; and the fact that most American
jurisdictions have now reformed their divorce laws to pro-
vide for realistic "no fault" grounds" indicates the domi-
ciliary state no longer places an inequitable burden on its
citizens which might encourage them to obtain a void for-
eign divorce in the first place.
I" E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4455 (West Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-60
(Supp. 1981); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977); VA. CODE § 20-107.1 to
107.3 (Supp. 1981); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.26 (Supp. 1980).
E.g., Walker v. Walker, 330 Mich. 332, 47 N.W.2d 633 (1951).
10 E.g., Sclamberg v. Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Cooper
v. Spencer, 218 Va. 541, 238 S.E.2d 805 (1977). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255
(1953).
'" E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1976); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979). But see Hewitt
v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
' E.g., Norris v. Norris, 342 Mich. 83, 69 N.W.2d 208 (1955); Attebery v.
Attebery, 172 Neb. 671, 111 N.W.2d 553 (1961); Newberry v. Newberry, 184
S.E.2d 704 (S.C. 1971), cited in Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 220.
Regarding the last-in-time marriage presumption, see generally Annot., 14
A.L.R.2d 7 (1950).
' See supra notes 97-98.
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IV. ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN ADVISING A FOREIGN
MIGRATORY DIVORCE
Although a comprehensive examination is beyond the
scope of this Article, ethical problems involved in advising a
client about a foreign country migratory divorce must still
be addressed. There are some earlier articles on the sub-
ject,167 but in light of recent reforms in American divorce
laws' " much of the sociological rationale behind these arti-
cles is now outdated; and a new comprehensive analysis of
the subject should be made to benefit current legal practi-
tioners.6 9 Some important concepts still require discussion.
The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions
refuse to recognize a foreign divorce decree unless at least
one of the spouses was a good-faith domiciliary in the for-
eign nation at the time the divorce was rendered,' 70 and the
doctrine of estoppel does not legally "validate" this void di-
vorce. " ' If the lawyer tells a client anything to the contrary,
this would be misleading and unethical. However, if the
lawyer had not originally helped to procure a void foreign
divorce, it would appear ethical and proper to defend a cli-
ent in a later collateral attack which might include the de-
fenses of estoppel,"7 2 laches,'7 8 or the last-in-time marriage
presumption.' 74
Regarding foreign bilateral divorces which lack the
"17 See, e.g., Drinker, Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litiga-
tion, 66 HARv. L. Rizv. 443 (1953); Note, The Role of a Lawyer in Divorce: Some
Ethical Problems, 21 U. Prrr. L. Rgv. 720 (1960); Adams and Adams, Ethical
Problems in Advising Migratory Divorce, 16 HASTNGs L.J. 60 (1964). See also
Groves, Migratory Divorce, 2 LAw & CoTEiw. PRoa. 293 (1935); and H.
EHRFNZWEIG, supra note 144, §§ 71-74. A major sociological problem for some of
these authors concerned the "restrictive divorce laws" in some American states,
which have now largely been alleviated.
' See supra notes 97-98, 100-102.
169 See supra note 10.
170 See supra notes 69-76.
1" See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 127-159 and accompanying text.
7s See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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domiciliary requirement, Professor Ehrenzweig has sug-
gested what might be called "the likelihood test":
If, as in the case in New York [Connecticut, U.S. Virgin Islands,
and Tennessee], a foreign non-domiciliary divorce may be recog-
nized as valid, there is no reason why an American attorney
should not assist in its procurement. On the other hand, he
should be held to act unethically if assisting in obtaining a di-
vorce likely to be held void in his or the spouses' state.' 75
Regarding foreign "mail-order" divorces which are void
in all states,1 7 6 the practitioner should be aware of a num-
ber of cases in which attorneys were disciplined for partici-
pating in obtaining Mexican mail-order divorces for Ameri-
can clients.1 7 7 Even in sister-state migratory divorces, the
ethical considerations can be sobering.1 78
In conclusion, the following "practical considerations"
are offered by attorneys Philip and Steven Adams: the at-
torney "will be prudent to act as though the [foreign di-
vorce] decree is a legal nullity, whether or not it is one" and
a "California underpinning" [a separate in-state divorce de-
cree] "is essential. 17 9 "We have seen how. . . precarious is
the legal status of out-of-state ex parte decrees, 80 but more
175 H. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 144, at 243; (emphasis added) cited in Adams
and Adams, supra note 167, at 78 (emphasis added).
'7' See supra note 73.
17 See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 274 A.D. 89, -, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (1948)
("It should be unnecessary for the courts to have to expressly advise attorneys
that their conduct is to be performed within the law and not in an attempt to
flout it .. ") See also In re Cohen, 10 N.J. 601, 93 A.2d 4 (1952); In re Esquitol,
285 A.D. 138, 136 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1954).
178 See, e.g., Griffith v. State Bar, 40 Cal. 2d 470, 254 P.2d 22 (1953) (void
migratory Texas divorce). "It would appear that in Griffith v. State Bar the [Cali-
fornia] supreme court has established extremely strict standards of volunteering
the disclosure of all hearsay information that might help strike down a foreign
divorce decree valid on its face, even if the disclosure would send the client to
prison for bigamy." Adams and Adams, supra note 169, at 98.
'7" Adams and Adams, supra note 167, at 98. But if an in-state divorce decree
is "essential," why procure a void foreign divorce decree in the first place? If the
client has previously procured a foreign divorce decree without the lawyer's assis-
tance, however, a separate in-state divorce decree would indeed be essential.
80 Foreign country ex parte divorce decrees are indeed "precarious" since no
American jurisdiction will recognize them. See supra note 74.
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importantly, they breed family confusion and strife," and as
for mail-order divorces "counsel must remonstrate as
strongly as possible against them."'' The Adams' conclu-
sion is that "[i]t is best that citizens should solve their legal
dilemmas in the state of which they are permanent inhabi-
tants .... "182
V. CONCLUSION
Foreign country migratory divorces are recognized in
the United States under the principle of comity. This prin-
ciple is distinct in theory and practice from sister-state mi-
gratory divorces that are recognized under the full faith and
credit clause as an instrument of uniformity within the
states.
Recognition of foreign divorces in the overwhelming
majority of American states is based upon a jurisdictional
requirement of domicile in the divorcing forum and, in
some exceptional circumstances, upon a residency require-
ment. This concept of domicile recognizes that an impor-
tant nexus exists between the state and its citizens in do-
mestic matters, and this nexus has been reaffirmed in
recent Supreme Court decisions. The domiciliary require-
ment for divorce jurisdiction thus remains a reasonable and
viable legal concept, especially in light of recent divorce re-
forms in most American jurisdictions, and it should not be
modified unless there is a clearly demonstrated need to do
so. Foreign "quickie" migratory divorces that lack this
domiciliary requirement should therefore be recognized as a
worthless legal sham and continue to be treated as void de-
crees by most American courts.
The estoppel defense does not legally validate a void
IBI Adams and Adams, supra note 167, at 99.
182 They continue to state however, "in the light of the restrictive divorce
laws of some states, and frequently because of publicity that could wreck a career,
out-of-state divorces are a necessary aspect of our lives." Id. This writer cannot
agree with that rationale. See especially supra notes 13-21, 38-46, 62-78, 97-106,
and 135 and accompanying text.
1982-831
HeinOnline  -- 21 J. Fam. L. 51 1982-1983
52 JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [Vol. 21
divorce. It may, however, estop the parties from collaterally
attacking a void decree. The estoppel defense in American
jurisdictions is currently beset by a disturbing conflict of
authority and differing legal theories. One suggested ap-
proach of Professor Phillips is to disallow estoppel in ac-
tions involving marital status; but to allow estoppel in non-
matrimonial property actions depending upon the equities
of each particular case. This would arguably permit a final
adjudication of marital status, and at the same time be eq-
uitable to the parties. A de facto spouse would also be pro-
tected by alternate remedies.
Finally, it must be emphasized that in the vast major-
ity of states an American attorney who attempts to procure
a foreign country divorce for a client is on notice that he is
procuring a void decree, and ethically he does so at his
peril.
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